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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on
Irregular Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary
mission is twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular
Warfare into the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME)
curricula; and second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars
together to share their knowledge and experiences about a vast array
of violent and non-violent irregular challenges. This case study is part
of an ongoing effort at CIWAG that includes symposia, lectures by
world-renowned academics, case studies, research papers, articles,
and books. Our aim is to make these case studies part of an evolving
and adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to
meet the challenges of the post-9/11 world.
Mr. Norman Nigh is the author of this case study, which focuses
on the use of Human Terrain Teams (HTT) in Afghanistan. The Human
Terrain System (HTS) is an innovative military intelligence support
program used by the US Army that employs civilian social scientists with
backgrounds in linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and regional studies
to provide military commanders with clearer insights into the local
population and culture in the regions in which they are deployed.
Mr. Nigh relies on his extensive experience as a Human Terrain
Team Advisor to create an insightful analysis of the opportunities and
challenges associated with the use of the Human Terrain System in
Afghanistan. This case study was created for three key purposes: first, to
explore how HTT advisors help military commanders enhance operational
effectiveness in the battlespace; second, to examine the specific strengths
and limitations associated with the use of civilian social scientists in the
battlefield environment; and third, to help military and civilian leaders be
better prepared to use Human Terrain Teams more effectively in future
engagements.
iii
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We believe Mr. Nigh has presented a balanced treatment of the
subject matter. Balance, however, does not mean that the case study will
be uncontroversial. In fact, Nigh’s analysis contains some rather blunt
appraisals of many actors in this conflict, including both Human Terrain
Teams and the US Army. The point is to shed light on the value of the
program and how the US military might exploit the Human Terrain
System more effectively in the future.
This case study was submitted in October 2011 and the vignettes
are from 2009-2010. Currently under USA TRADOC, the HTT program
continues to grow and develop, but this case takes a snapshot of the
program—at a point where both operators and HTT analysts were figuring
out its utility and limitations—in order to give the reader insight into the
challenges and dilemmas they faced on the ground.
It is also important to note three critical caveats to this case study.
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval
War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately responsible
for the content of this case study. Third, the study questions presented in
all CIWAG case studies are written to provoke discussion on a wide
variety of topics, including strategic, operational, and tactical matters as
well as ethical and moral questions confronted by operators in the
battlefield. The point is to make these case studies part of an evolving and
adaptive curriculum that fulfills the needs of students preparing to meet
the challenges of the post-9/11 world and to show them the dilemmas that
real people faced in high-pressure situations. Some of the most
challenging questions asked in the case are: what would you do, what are
your rules of engagement and moral and ethical constraints, and what
would be the operational and strategic consequences of your decisions?
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I. Introduction: Counterinsurgency — Theory vs. Reality
“Yeah, I’m all about hearts and minds, two shots in the heart and one in
the head, now that’s COIN,” jokingly remarked a young US Marine Corps
captain while flipping through FM 3-24, the official US Army/Marine
Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. The Marine captain was one of
22 US military and civilian personnel that had come together in a
makeshift conference room at Forward Operating Base Shank in
Afghanistan’s Logar Province to attend General Stanley McChrystal’s
“COIN Academy.”
The battle-hardened group of men and women, made up of soldiers
from the Army and the Marines Corps, as well as civilians from various
government agencies, represented the frontline of counterinsurgency
warfare (COIN) in Afghanistan. They had been called to the COIN
Academy because commanders realized that the fate of Operation
Enduring Freedom rested on the ability of operators to implement COIN
doctrine in the field.
Despite the initiative to implement COIN objectives at the tactical
level, an atmosphere of confusion at the operational level persists. In large
part, a decade-long conflict, with revolving strategies, ambiguous
objectives, and a clandestine enemy, has fueled frustration, anger, and
resentment among military forces:
The people who wrote this don’t understand what it’s like
on the ground. It sounds good on paper and stuff like this
gets people promoted but at the end of the day it’s our lives
they are playing with. I am told to secure a village, get to
know the people, shake hands, take pictures with locals and
tell my superiors about what the hell is going on – what
bull****.… I have no idea who these people are, what they
want, or how to communicate with them. The locals accuse
2
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me of peeping on their wives, disrespecting their culture
and killing their friends. When we’re not getting shot at or
finding IEDs, local kids throw rocks at my guys and the
locals demand money. Yet I am told to exhibit tactical
patience and focus on the big picture. The situation is
f***ed.1
The above snapshot captures the situation faced by many operators
on the ground in Afghanistan. Talk of COIN is everywhere, especially on
the lips of senior military and civilian leadership. In practice, COIN
presents complex operational challenges. To implement a COIN strategy
successfully, a company or platoon must fully understand the people with
whom it is dealing. It must then use that knowledge of local customs and
traditions to develop a COIN-centric strategy unique to the area. Many
soldiers in Afghanistan, however, have not studied the region’s history or
its tribal languages, and consequently struggle to interact with local
populations. Moreover, the generic COIN checklists and principles handed
down from headquarters are rarely applicable to specific situations, and
only exacerbate the challenges of implementing counterinsurgency
strategies.
In 2007, after nearly six years of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan,
military strategists began devising alternatives to the enemy centric model
of warfare. During the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (2001), policy makers did not anticipate
prolonged conflicts. In each case, when traditional, kinetic methods were
applied, insurgents went “all quiet” – a strategic response that U.S.
planners incorrectly interpreted as a sign of imminent victory. But
insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan remerged, engaging American and
NATO forces in protracted military campaigns. Coalition involvement in
these conflicts has proven costly; NATO and the U.S. have not only
1

Anonymous, February 18, 2010
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exhausted their resources, but – because of continued incidents of
collateral damage – have continued to alienate local populations. As a
result, the Coalition has actually furthered the objectives of Al Qaida and
its affiliates.
Recognizing this, Gen. Petraeus, Gen. McChrystal, and others
implemented a stronger counterinsurgency model, one explicitly focused
on securing the population as its primary goal. This new emphasis on
COIN required military operators and commanders to become more
knowledgeable about the indigenous population. In order to protect and
gain the trust of the people, local concerns, attitudes, and needs were given
precedence. As Gen. Petraeus noted, “You have to understand not just
what we call the military terrain…the high ground and low ground. It’s
about understanding the human terrain, really understanding it.”2
One of the greatest challenges US and NATO forces have faced in
recent COIN operations is comprehending and overcoming their enemy’s
antiquated warfare culture. “Afghan social, political, economic, and
cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF [International
Security Assistance Force] does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics
in local communities, nor how the insurgency, corruption, incompetent
officials, power brokers, and criminality all combine to affect the Afghan
population. A focus by ISAF intelligence on kinetic targeting and a failure
to bring together what is known about the political and social realm have
hindered ISAF’s comprehension of critical aspects of Afghan society.”3 In
2005 the Department of Defense released hundreds of millions of dollars
to fund new programs that would bring this alternative COIN perspective
to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Programs were designed to help
operators in the field better understand the local culture and develop
stronger relationships with the population while also providing senior
leadership with expert advice. Ultimately, these new programs intended to
2
3

Babak Dehghanpisheh , “Scions of the Surge,” Newsweek, March 2008.
Robert Dreyfuss, “Blind in Afghanistan,” The Nation, January 2010.
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transform what General McChrystal has called “a conventional force that
is poorly configured for COIN.”4
Implementing the newly revised COIN doctrine successfully
required academics and subject matter experts (SMEs). Recognizing that
senior leadership depends on operators to interpret a very complex and
paradoxical battle space, US Army leadership created Human Terrain
Systems (HTS), teams of social scientists who seek to "recruit, train,
deploy, and support an embedded operationally focused socio-cultural
capability; conduct operationally relevant socio-cultural research and
analysis; develop and maintain a socio-cultural knowledge base, in order
to enable operational decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness,
and preserve and share socio-cultural institutional knowledge."5 This
socio-cultural information allows NATO forces to compete with
insurgents for “hearts and minds”; groups such as Al-Qaida and the
Taliban are no longer the only actors who can use knowledge of local
cultural and religious practices to their advantage.
The fundamental mission behind the creation of HTS was to
embed SMEs and individuals with formal training in the social sciences
with operators in the field. HTS personnel used their knowledge of
linguistics, psychology, anthropology, economics, history, sociology, and
political science to help decipher and articulate characteristics of the social
terrain to command. The idea was to support operators in the field by
developing COIN principles appropriate for specific areas of operation
(AO), and to aid senior leadership by providing a more nuanced
articulation of the battle-space – a perspective that would serve as a
counterweight to the traditional U.S. view of war. As Sun Tzu observed,

David B. Edwards, “Counterinsurgency as a Cultural System,” Small Wars Journal,
December 2010.
5
CPT Nathan Finney, “Human Terrain Team Handbook,” TRADOC G2, 2008.
4
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“So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you can
win a hundred battles without a single loss.”6
One of the greatest challenges HTS confronted was making their
advisory support applicable to direct and indirect warfighters alike.
Initially, HTS doctrine was created with the Special Operations Force
(SOF) community in mind. As SOF assignments shifted to kill/capture
missions, however, and as the interagency responsibilities of SOF
increased, they had less and less time to engage non-kinetically with the
population. “While some of the Special Forces missions are centered on
training of allied forces, often that line is blurred. In some cases, ‘training’
is used as a cover for unilateral, direct action. It's often done under the
auspices of training so that they can go anywhere. It's brilliant. It is
essentially what we did in the ‘60s," says a Special Forces source.7 As a
result, command began placing more and more responsibility on
conventional forces to engage the population, train indigenous forces, and
promote stability through the use of development funds. Thus, the mission
of HTS teams evolved, and embedded personnel refocused their efforts on
supporting conventional units and their role in the irregular warfare battle
space.
In irregular warfare, COIN exists on the chalk line between direct
and indirect action.8 Relying on one method exclusively creates an
6

Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).
Jeremy Scahill, “Obama’s Expanding Covert Wars,” The Nation, 2009.
8
Direct: In the context of military special operations, direct action (DA) consists of
“Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special
operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and which employ
specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage
designated targets. Direct action differs from conventional offensive actions in the level
of physical and political risk, operational techniques, and the degree of discriminate and
precise use of force to achieve specific objectives.” -US Department of Defense, Joint
Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
(2007-07-12). Indirect: Military action in support of political, economic, and
informational initiatives which are so dominant that they shape the form of the military
action; military action through support of another party, such as security assistance to
7
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operational vacuum easily exploited by the enemy. The problem with
employing both strategies jointly, however, is that direct and indirect
actors often undermine each other’s efforts. This zero-sum relationship is
based on the premise that direct and indirect action compete for control of
the battle space. When both methods are implemented without
coordination, the populace receives a distorted – and often competing –
message. In indirect action, the population is told that it is the priority, that
efforts will be focused on reconstruction, peace building, and the
elimination of the insurgency. In direct action, the population is often
involved in collateral damage or marginalized during the targeting of
insurgents. Although both actions play a vital role in counterinsurgency,
they must be coordinated to achieve a cohesive result. As former
Commander of US SOCOM, Admiral Olson, stated in 2009, “While the
direct approach is mostly decisive in its impact, it also buys the time for
the indirect approach to have its desired effect.”9
To conduct indirect and direct action, operators must be able to
explain the ground-level complexity to commanders and policy makers.
This is not an easy task. It requires a thorough understanding of the human
terrain, strong relationships with local allies, a detailed understanding of
localized conflict triggers, and a deep respect for the indigenous people.
To help direct and indirect operators engage noncombatants more
successfully, US policy makers and military strategists have developed
engagement programs focused on the population, such as HTS, to aid
operators in the field. These programs aim to help operators contextualize
the population, develop a deeper understanding of their actions, and better
articulate characteristics of the battle-space to commanders and policy
makers. To better understand how programs such as HTS work to support
friendly foreign armed forces.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-20/10020gl.htm
9
Admiral Eric T. Olson, “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare,” The Journal of
International Security Affairs 16 (2009).
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direct and indirect action, it is important to discuss the roles of
conventional and irregular warfare in counterinsurgency operations.
Historically, military might has been defined by the strength of
conventional forces. Metrics such as the number of soldiers, units of
military equipment, and volume of ordnance, along with a military’s level
of technological sophistication, are often used as indicators of capacity
and effectiveness. In symmetrical warfare, these capabilities are
paramount to success. In irregular conflicts, however, one needs to look
deeper to understand how – or even if – conventional tactics are effective.
By conducting operations in accordance with the laws of a host country,
for instance, conventional forces can give credibility to governments
whose legitimacy is in question. On the other hand, the use of direct action
allows conventional forces to isolate and terminate threats. Merely
carrying arms and conducting operations openly can provide an interim
system of order, temporarily stabilizing regions that had been corrupted by
insurgency. In Operation Phantom Fury, for example, American and
British forces dislodged insurgents from Fallujah, depriving them of their
last stronghold in Iraq. While this kind of conventional approach does
usually prove necessary, its effects are mostly short-term.
The ultimate goal in creating HTS was to supplement military and
civilian efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan by providing a subject matter
capability and helping to interpret social grievances and the role they play
in conflict. By identifying the factors leading to violence, Human Terrain
Teams (HTT) help field operators, commanders, and policy officials better
understand the civilian population. Each program assists with strategy
implementation, consensus building, and casualty reduction. Secondary
efforts focus on leveraging community resources and gradually reducing
US and NATO expenditures – measures that will help achieve the end
goal of Afghan self-sufficiency. Further, HTS’s capability is aimed at
helping military and civilian leadership map out a nexus of second- and
8
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third-order effects, an activity that will ultimately increase operational
efficiency and maintain combat strength.
Sections I and II of this case study explore how HTT advisors can
aid operators and military/civilian leadership in the irregular warfare
battle-space. The sections begin with a community profile that identifies
the social, cultural, economic, and political issues affecting a specific local
environment. This is followed by an outline of NATO strategies and an
analysis of their effects on both the population and the insurgency. A net
social science assessment is presented in Section III, which examines the
effects of COIN activities on operations and analyzes alternative courses
of action. Finally, Section IV discusses matters related to the
implementation of social science methodologies – including their
limitations in the field – and a sample operational schedule is presented in
Section V. Ultimately, this case study aims to serve as a resource for
operators utilizing counterinsurgency advisory support and is intended to
make those operators better prepared for the challenges of irregular
warfare.

Discussion Questions
1. COIN doctrine vs. COIN application: Can doctrine be applied
despite an unwilling population?
2. Can non-military entities be effective in a non-permissive
environment? Do they present challenges, liabilities, support, or
guidance?
3. Do academics and subject matter experts have a place on the
battlefield? Can soldiers be taught to implement research and
analytical techniques that experts could provide? If yes, can
soldiers overcome groupthink or institutional biases that could
distort their findings?
9
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4. In irregular warfare, do direct and indirect operators need
COIN/SME advisors? Is one operator better suited over another to
implement COIN?
5. Can indirect or direct action undermine COIN application?
6. What limitations do operators have in the field when it comes to
developing relationships with locals, understanding their culture,
and mitigating conflict with non-kinetic actors?

10
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II. Heart of Darkness

Figure 1: Nakhonay

The young Canadian lieutenant glared furiously into the eyes of village
leader “Haji Malma.”10 “I know who you are, you piece of ****. You are
the man responsible for the death of my friends and I’m not going to let
that go. I am going to take Nakhonay back from you and we are never
going to give up!”
Malma, a stoic village elder, known Taliban judge, and suspected
architect of countless Canadian deaths, smiled unapologetically at the 15

10

Name has been changed.
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well-armed Canadian troops staring him down. There was nothing the
Canadians could do, and Malma knew it.
Like most sophisticated Taliban leaders in Afghanistan, Malma
was taking advantage of McChrystal’s COIN war. On the surface, he
appeared to be a benign village elder, interested only in the well-being of
the people of Nakhonay. This cover gave him credibility in the community
and with the wider NATO public. He often sought “development funds”
from aid organizations and NATO troops.
Beneath the surface, however, Malma was a key Pakistanieducated Al-Qaida supporter who controlled one of the most dangerous
and strategically important areas in Kandahar. “No progress happens
because Haji Malma stop-drops it all,” the lieutenant argued as she briefed
Milner and Lt.-Gen. Peter Devlin, Canada’s Chief of Land Staff. “But
other than him, the other village elders have actually supported us.”11
The problem facing this Canadian platoon – the mendacity of local
Afghan leadership – was endemic throughout Afghanistan. On the surface,
village elders, mullahs, and business owners appear to cooperate with
NATO forces. But behind the scenes these individuals plotted frontline
attacks and orchestrated targeted killings. NATO troops know that Afghan
leaders are involved in these actions, yet they are required to stand-down.
Frustration and seething anger can result, as soldiers are unable to realize
justice for the friends they’ve lost. When they take root, these heightened
emotions often blur an operator’s ability to understand the population and
wage an effective COIN war.
Nakhonay, located in Panjwayii district, is considered one of the
most volatile areas in Afghanistan. According to a recent newspaper
article, “While much of Panjwaii has stabilized in recent months due to a
surge of American and Afghan troops, Nakhonay has remained something
of an exception. Over the years, it's been a notorious trouble spot, where at

11

Paul Watson, “Afghanistan: Where Success Can Bring Failure,” The Star (2010).
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least seven Canadian soldiers have died since 2009.”12 From Alexander
the Great’s arrival in the region in 300 BC to Operation Enduring
Freedom, Nakhonay has been a center of tribal, religious, economic, and
logistical conflict. Its proximity to Kandahar, the Argandab River (the
largest river in southern Afghanistan), Pakistan, and major transportation
lines (including the export route for opium from Helmand), as well as its
strategic position regarding southern Asia and the Middle East, has made
it a hotly contested area for over a thousand years. Over the past fifty
years alone, Nakhonay has been occupied – but never subdued – by
British, Canadian, American, Indian, Pakistani, and Soviet troops.
Nakhonay is located near the Maiwand, home of the Taliban’s
Mullah Omar, and is rife with Taliban sympathizers and militants.
Considered the spiritual home of the Taliban, it is symbolically important
to the insurgency. With strong connections to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and
other Gulf states, Nakhonay is known for housing some of the most
radical Muslims in Afghanistan. In the mid-1990s, Saudi militants
introduced Kandahar to a strict form of Salafi Islam. While Riyadh has
downplayed the Kingdom’s ties to the fundamentalist movement (even
going so far as to offer “rehabilitation” programs for captured Islamist
fighters), Salafism remains a potent force in the Islamic world. As Michael
Scheuer argues:
Perhaps the best way to get a handle on this issue is to understand
that much of the above—the attacks, the recanters, the reeducation camps, Riyadh’s ecumenical outreach—is a diversion
from the key variable in the future vitality of Islamist militancy:
The doctrine of Salafism and its continuing proliferation. Bin
Laden and his allies are overwhelmingly Salafist; men and
women who profess an austere, semi-martial brand of Sunni
Keith Gerein, “Soldier slain in Afghan blast 2 weeks from vacation,” Edmonton
Journal, March 29, 2011, p. A5.
12
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Islam based on the Quran, the Sunnah and the traditions of the
“pious ancestors,” the first four generations of Islamic leaders.
Salafism is Saudi Arabia’s state religion; it is taught at all levels
of its school system to Saudis and others who come from abroad
to study or are the children of immigrant Muslim workers and it
is the faith Riyadh exports to all areas of the world via a large,
well-funded proselytizing program staffed by Salafi clerics
educated in the kingdom. Salafism is the engine of contemporary
jihad; its base is in Saudi Arabia; and no amount of jihadist
recanting or damning by the “king’s clerics” will stunt Salafi
jihadism as long as the doctrine is taught and continues to grow
in popularity.13
Militants focused on Nakhonay because of its central location, strong
Islamic background, and independently sustainable agricultural economy.
Shortly after they targeted it, the area became known as the hub of the
Taliban’s shadow government in Kandahar.
Strategically speaking, Nakhonay and its surrounding villages in
Panjwai District represent major choke points in southern Afghanistan.
Not only is the area the historic birthplace of the Taliban, but its resilience
against NATO forces sends a strong message to Afghan citizens to keep
up the fight. From Nakhonay, Taliban leaders have coordinated large-scale
attacks against NATO forces and interests. They keep fighters in nearby
communities and are careful to use layers of communication when
contacting them – strategies that allow the “shadow” leadership to
maintain plausible deniability after incidents of insurgent violence. As one
journalist covering the region has observed, “Canadian soldiers cleared
Nakhonay in 2007 and twice in 2008 but, without the troop strength to
Scheuer, Michael, “Saudi Salafism a Stronger Force in Islamist Militancy than
Recanting Clerics,” Terrorism Focus vol. 5 no. 26, July 16, 2008.
13
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remain in the area, insurgents seeped back in as soon as they left. The
village continued to serve as the seat of the Taliban's shadow government
in Kandahar province.”14 For the past decade, NATO forces have been
attempting to build a case against the local officials in Nakhonay. Without
direct evidence of their participation in insurgent activities, however,
NATO has been unable to transition a new cadre of leaders into positions
of power. Taliban leaders continue to operate freely in Nakhonay.
The implementation of COIN strategies in the area is further
complicated by the military’s use of ASCOPE (Area, Structures,
Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events) – a method of assessing
the role of cultural factors in tactical operations. Under ASCOPE,
Coalition officials may not easily interfere with local power structures. So
long as village leaders are perceived as key members of the community
and are not directly involved in anti-NATO activities – such as placing
bombs, directly attacking troops, or harboring weapons – it is virtually
impossible to remove them.
It’s clear that NATO forces have been tasked with a difficult,
seemingly contradictory, mission: they must work to build relationships
with local communities while also distancing themselves from the first
layers of leadership in those groups. Haji Malma and his band of Taliban
associates actively put themselves between the Canadian troops and the
population, creating a complex social and military environment for the
Canadian forces to navigate. As difficult as situations like this may be,
NATO forces must explore alternative courses of action when confronted
with them; they must pursue strategies that will ultimately delegitimize the
Taliban’s “shadow” leaders, influence local populations in positive ways,
and bring stability to Afghan communities.
To fulfill these objectives, command directed a Human Terrain Team
to develop a comprehensive picture of the operational environment and to
Dene Moore, “Canadian platoon’s life in Afghan village is a lesson in patience,” The
Record [Waterloo, Ont.], Sept. 13, 2010.
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present its findings to the Commander of Task Force Kandahar. This sixman team, consisting of subject matter experts, military tacticians, and
communications specialists, embedded with Canadian forces for a 21-day
mission.
Mission objectives were as follows:
1. Define characteristics of key civilian areas, including districts,
municipalities, and provinces in the targeted area of operation.
Focus efforts on areas of high economic value, centers of
government or political discourse, culturally important areas, and
tribal/ethnic enclaves.
2. Analyze the capability of local authorities to perform key functions
and provide the populace with essential services. Develop metrics
of essential capabilities required to save and sustain life, including
the development of health clinics, the provision of food, water, and
sanitation services, and the operation of public administration and
public safety organizations.
3. Understand how the community is organized according to local
definitions of order and influence. Distinguish who is formally and
informally influential in the community and what characteristics
(wealth, education, family lineage, ethnicity, and tribe) influence
perception. Determine if influential members of the community are
affiliated with organizations that may be indigenous to the area.
When the assignment was over, the team had compiled significant data on
Nakhonay’s social groups, power brokers, and hierarchy of needs. The
team outlined targets of opportunity for implementing COIN and
development strategies, assessed progress in the AO, determined secondand third-order effects of the current strategy, and identified fault lines
between the Canadians and the populace.
The team gave General Menard and General Vance of Task Force
Kandahar recommendations in three areas:
1.
How to frame the issue of corruption
16
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2.
3.

How to respond to Taliban supporters
How to address combat outpost compensation

A. Recommendation One: Rethinking Corruption
Human Terrain System advisors encouraged Task Force Kandahar
(TFK) not to remove key business leaders from the community, despite
allegations of corruption.. Rather, they recommended that Task Force
Kandahar focus on reconsidering its perception of development and
stabilization in context with the cultural nuances of the community;
specifically, distinguishing between market integration and our Western
perception of corruption.
At the local level in Afghanistan, where grassroots development
and foreign direct investment have taken place, certain individuals are the
major beneficiaries of those activities. These individuals control the
majority of local business in their respective areas and absorb 99% of
foreign development contracts from NATO, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations. Most development
professionals and military decision makers do not know how to deal with
these individuals effectively because of the specific Afghan business ethic;
by Western standards, these businessmen should be in jail.
If we pull back and take a long-horizon perspective, the situation
is far better than it appears. What these men represent is the first rung on
the development ladder. In a country that lacks a rule of law, a structured
economic market place and any accountability, these men have found a
way to mitigate enormous risk and productively employ the local labor
force, acquire scarce resources and synthesize labor and management to
effectively achieve results. The effect accomplishes staggering economic
gains and sets a precedent that is deeply encouraging for the local people.
Furthermore, the economic structures they help establish lead to
something even more important than higher rates of employment. Trade
17

NIGH: AN OPERATOR’S GUIDE TO HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS

and the opportunity for economic advancement make people behave more
fairly. When individuals – regardless of their social stature – see
themselves as part of the economic system, they recognize a sense of
ownership in the community and begin to develop a competitive ethos that
will drive them to improve their circumstances.
There is no doubt that Afghanistan, ranked 176 out of 178 on the
Corruption Perception Index,15 is one of the most corrupt countries on the
planet. In order to understand why corruption is so prevalent there, it is
helpful to first differentiate between bribery, kickbacks, and wholesale
embezzling. Wholesale embezzling, or otherwise absconding with public
money at the expense of the population, is a moot argument; its effect on
the population, with the exception of the primary embezzler, is entirely
damaging. On the other hand, corruption and kickbacks of public
procurement act as a necessary evil to mitigate risk, leverage against
liabilities, and promote cooperation. Afghanistan lacks accountability in
the central government and regulation in the financial system. In light of
these shortcomings, corruption may serve an important economic
function; instead of being a product of dishonesty and greed, it may
simply be a method toward market integration, a rational means of making
up for a lack of oversight. Consider the following:Economic systems are
built on relationships. In the West, the majority of time spent in business is
devoted to soliciting clients and to maintaining relationships with them
once they have been secured. This form of trust building enables each
party to develop confidence in, and loyalty toward, the other. The amount
of money spent on these activities dwarfs the amount that is spent on
bribes, payoffs, and other “corrupt” payments in Afghanistan. While the
patterns of exchange that exist in Afghanistan are defined as “corruption,”
it’s worth remembering that these exchanges represent a rudimentary
economic system, that they’re a form of establishing trust and cooperation
with strangers, and that they’re intended to lower transaction costs and
15

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results

18

NIGH: AN OPERATOR’S GUIDE TO HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS

generate greater prosperity for all involved. Ultimately, they ensure
mutually beneficial exchanges in situations where the participants are not
bound by kinship, status, or other social ties.
Ultimately a cost benefit analysis was conducted; results
indicated that the removal of key business leadership in the area would
inflict a catastrophic impact on the economy, including the larger
Panjwai province. The assessment highlighted the vulnerabilities that
new management would face in completing construction, training, and
development tasks. Retaliation from said key business leadership could
be expected through sabotage, direct attacks on NATO forces, and
increased cooperation with Taliban forces. The contagious effect on
unemployment would also create disastrous second- and third-order
effects such as increased partnerships between locals and the Taliban,
locals returning to poppy cultivation, increased vulnerability toward
religious radicalization, and dire humanitarian consequences.
Furthermore, after a comprehensive ethnographic study was completed
on the topic of corruption, virtually the entire village agreed that the
Western term “bribery” was nothing more than tarrun, an Afghan
word for contract or agreement.

B. Recommendation Two: Responding to Taliban
Presence
Social science operators advised TFK not to use violence when
engaging low-level Taliban supporters and empathizers in the community.
The Taliban have significant influence in Nakhonay. Members
have direct ties to civic and business leaders, and there is virtually no
distinction between supporters of the insurgency and the local population.
The community’s identity is rooted in the inception, history, and evolution
19
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of the Taliban ethos. For the people who inhabit Nakhonay and the
surrounding villages, the Taliban is not an insurgency of foreigners; the
Taliban is family. Three decades of conflict, abuse, and manipulation have
solidified the need for Taliban leadership in Nakhonay. Changing
influence, needs-based strategic decision making, an evolving ethos, and a
willingness to adapt to enemy tactics, however, have redefined the
Taliban’s identity and operational tempo. In an effort to maintain
legitimacy, allocate finances, garner support, and recruit members, the
Taliban has evolved into a more shrewd and cosmopolitan insurgency.
Essentially, the organization’s associates in the region are learning the
advantages of waging war on multiple fronts — economic, political, and
religious — making Nakhonay an excellent case study for the new face of
the Taliban.
The Taliban exist in Nakhonay on multiple levels. From
information gathered on the ground, it would seem that “virtually
everyone is associated with the Taliban.” Taliban exist in every mosque,
business, farm, and home. Taliban leaders commute in and out of
Nakhonay daily, their identity protected by a strong warrior ethos and
“Takfiri”16 methodology. They’re mullahs, elders, shop owners, farmers,
teachers, and doctors, and are represented in both the Afghan National
Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Interestingly, the
Taliban presence in Nakhonay has evolved over time, and the insurgency
now exists in various layers within the community – all of them
significant. Observing these layers, it is possible to distinguish between
Taliban warriors, representatives, and supporters. The warrior class –
including fighters, suicide bombers, and IED strategists – represents the
frontline of the Taliban. The second layer, comprised of men known as
16

Takfiris have been classified by some commentators as violent offshoots of the Salafi
movement, yet while Salafism is seen as a form of “fundamentalist Islam,” it is not an
inherently violent movement and does not condone terrorism. Takfiris, on the other hand,
condone acts of violence as legitimate methods of achieving religious or political goals.
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“representatives,” seeks to influence community behavior by engaging in
consensus-building activities and by lobbying decision makers in key
industries. A third layer – the insurgency’s supporters – is not involved in
direct action, but instead affects the community through propaganda and
recruiting. The Taliban’s presence in Nakhonay consists predominately of
the latter two groups, representatives and supporters.
Ultimately, HTS encouraged Task Force Kandahar to allow
Nakhonay to continue growing unabated, despite the area’s strong Taliban
connections. At the time this recommendation was made, Task Force
Kandahar was preparing for another clearing operation in the area. Since
the many previous clearing operations had resulted in little to no change, it
was the opinion of HTS field staff that a better strategy was needed.
Analysts believed it might be more effective to divide and conquer the
population through an oil spot plan, a strategy described in detail by Karl
Slaikeu:
The oil spot (OS) COIN strategy draws on the analogy of a
cheese cloth representing a country. Drops of oil, one at a time
and over time, eventually cover the entire cloth. The process
begins with establishing a 100% secure perimeter, accomplished
by CF in the first instance, and then transferred to local military
in a particular village or other area of operation, and then, within
this safe environment, launching stability initiatives, including
services, governance, and development. With one OS functioning
and under the protection of local army and police, CF partners
with the Afghan Security Forces (ASF) to launch other OS
villages. The advantages of this approach lie in the discrete gains
that can be protected (as in shape, clear, hold, and build [FM
3.24]), and most important, each oil spot is a visible
manifestation of the desired end state for the entire war. Any
friend, foe, or fence sitter can see what CF is up to by looking at
21
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security protected and services rendered within the oil spot
village/town/city.17
Implementation of an OS strategy required both short- and longterm planning. In the short term, TFK would develop a community on the
periphery of Nakhonay (Haji Baba); there, troops would undertake
reconstruction activities, broaden employment opportunities, and provide
security. The long-term strategy involved further development of Haji
Baba, ultimately giving the inhabitants of Nakhonay a perspective of what
life could be if they cooperated with the Canadian forces. As a 2010 article
suggests, the strategy appears to be working: “Canadian troops have since
pulled out of Nakhonay. Reintjes' team has set up in a compound in the
neighboring village of Haji Baba, where warm food and running water are
a luxury. Reintjes recently set a personal record: 34 days without a
shower…. A lot of things have changed since then, and they were in the
thick of the action by August around Nakhonay, a town now infamous as a
killing zone….”18

C. Recommendation Three: Addressing Combat Outpost
Compensation
As discussed in the beginning of this case study, a Canadian
regiment established a combat outpost in an abandoned home in the center
of Nakhonay. After they moved in, they noticed a sharp uptick in the acts
of violence directed against them. This violence did not match Human
Karl A. Slaikeu, “Winning the War in Afghanistan: An Oil Spot Plus Strategy for
Coalition Forces,” Small Wars Journal May 2009.
18
Jonathan Montpetit, “Canadian soldiers resume mentoring Afghan National Army after
turbulent spring,” Military World, Oct. 28, 2010. Even locals seem to have been
anticipating a relatively calm few months due to the increased Canadian troop presence.
17
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Intelligence (HUMINT) reporting, which indicated that Taliban fighters
had left the area to harvest poppies in Helmand. General Menard of TFK
instructed HTS members to go into the field to determine the source of the
hostility and what could be done to fix it.
A team of six HTS members visited the area and interviewed
locals. The team learned that a sub-tribe was angry at the regiment for
having moved into one of the local homes. This home was owned by a
village elder, a man from their tribe who lived in Kandahar half of the year
and in his Nakhonay home the other half of the year. The Canadian
regiment hadn’t realized this when they selected the home as their outpost
station. The violence, then, was the sub-tribe’s method of retaliation; they
were attacking the Canadian troops in an effort to drive them from the
elder’s property. After the HTT discovered this, they organized a meeting
between the Platoon and the elder, ultimately devising a compensation
repayment plan covering the regiment’s occupation of the compound.
Within days, violence in the area noticeably decreased and relations
between the community and the Canadians improved.

Discussion Questions
1.
Can the population be positively influenced despite corrupt
leadership? Do you always have to remove corrupt leaders, or can
you work around them? How do you do this? What are the risks to
your objectives and to the people you are working with?
2.
If you knew that the only way to build a school, health
clinic, or road in Afghanistan involved bribery, would you pay the
bribe in order to pursue the development project? Where would
you draw the line?
3.
When we talk about “helping the Afghans,” does that imply
that we indoctrinate them with U.S. values? Can we help them
while also observing their ethical standards? What are the
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risks/rewards of each approach? When do the risks outweigh the
rewards? What does “helping Afghans” really mean?
4.
In an area that is thick with Taliban sympathizers and
insurgents, can COIN-by-proxy (as in the case of Haji Baba) create
a demand for change among the local population?
5.
Given Nakhonay’s profile, what other options were
available?
6.
What was missed?
7.
What vulnerabilities can be exploited in Nakhonay to turn
people against the Taliban?
8.
What is the role of land tenure?
9.
What negative effects are associated with giving in to local
pressure?
10.
Despite the success of the mission, what were the risks and
limitations of the effort?
11.
What could have prevented the escalation in violence in the
first place?
12.
What would have been the likely outcome in each scenario
without the HTS recommendations? What alternative courses of
action would have been taken, and what would their effects be?
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III. Tagab: The Lost Valley

Figure 2: Tagab Valley

Tagab Valley has never been held by a foreign force. Known as
“The Lost Valley” by the Soviets, Tagab has long been a major Pashtun
enclave, housing some of the greatest fighters in Afghanistan. For
centuries, Tagab has celebrated a strong warrior culture by housing,
feeding, and providing medical care for fighters in the area. The legacy
that defines Tagab is based on the work of the late Mashayakh Miagul Jan
Aga (aka Mohammad Sharif). Mohammad Sharif was a prominent leader
who was instrumental in organizing regional opposition to the communist
government in northern Afghanistan. Mujahedeen fighters used Tagab as a
regional combat outpost for direct attacks against Soviet interests in Kabul
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and Bagram Air Base. That esprit de corps is still present in the region
today, and is bolstered by external actors who have helped create a strong
indigenous fighting force in the community. As noted in a recent Center
for Naval Analysis report, “The southern Tagab Valley was a stronghold
of Pakistan-based insurgents responsible for numerous large-scale attacks
in eastern Afghanistan. Enemy fighters moved freely through the area and
controlled the population. There was no government presence there in
2008.”19
Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom in October
2001, NATO allies have been unable to clear and secure Tagab. Fierce
Taliban fighters, as well as politically motivated insurgencies such as
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) and the Haqqani network, compete for
territorial control of the area.20 “Many of the insurgents making this push,
according to this NGO worker, are actually from Pakistan: the HiG
networks in the province remain mostly as they were, at least
geographically (so mostly limited to places like the Tagab). While last
night the police finally arrested one of the insurgent surveillance teams,
there is tremendous concern that, much like in early 2008, Haqqani
Network and HiG fighters will use Kapisa as a staging ground to launch
anti-election attacks on Kabul.”21
Logistical, historical, and geographic features make Tagab
especially attractive to these groups. Located at the base of the Hindu
Kush Mountains, Tagab Valley is a weapons and narcotics hub. Insurgents
have established complex routes through the seemingly impassable chain
of mountains that directly link Tagab to Pakistan and the Islamic Emirate
of Waziristan. “The [Tagab] valley, only 30 miles from Kabul, is rife with
drug and timber smugglers, as well as insurgents. The insurgents are
Jerry-Katt Meyerle and Jim Megan-Gavrilis, “Counterinsurgency on the Ground in
Afghanistan,” CNA Analysis & Solutions, November 2010.
20
Jeffrey H. Norwitz,“Armed Groups,” US Naval War College, August 2008.
21
Joshua Foust, “Kapisa Teeters,” Registan.net, 2009.
19
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Taliban fighters and gunmen loyal to warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Officials say that based on their accents, some of the men appear to be
Pakistani and Uzbeki.”22 Tagab’s proximity to Kabul and Bagram Air
Force Base has also made it a significant strategic location for the Taliban.
Over the past decade, countless attacks on Kabul and Bagram have been
planned and executed from this Taliban staging ground.
On April 28, 2008, during a high-profile parade honoring
Afghanistan National Day in downtown Kabul, Afghan President Hamid
Karzai and dozens of top-ranking NATO military and civilian leadership
experienced the brazen contempt of the Taliban. At the height of the
ceremony, gunfire erupted in close proximity to Karzai and several NATO
dignitaries, sending the crowd into a panic. Chaos ensued as Afghan and
NATO troops worked frantically to secure an area in which there was no
clear shooter and thousands were running for their lives. The Taliban
experienced a major victory that day. It sent a global message that, despite
the best efforts of the world’s most powerful countries, it was still in
control of Afghanistan. NATO leadership, stunned at the clandestine
nature of the attack, tracked the center of the operation to Tagab, a small
village in Kapsia Province. According to a reporter covering the story,
“The Taliban's ability to attack a ceremony amid heightened security in
the heart of Kabul while scores of VIPs attended served as a major
propaganda coup for the Taliban who previously claimed they can launch
an attack anywhere in Afghanistan at a time of their choosing. The
preceding raid in Kapisa may also be significant, indicating the Taliban's
reliance on the Tagab Valley as the key staging ground for attacks against
targets in Kabul and Bagram.”23

22

Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson,“US-Afghan Forces Try to Stabilize Lawless Region,” NPR,
2007.
23
Matt Dupee, “Kapisa Province: The Taliban’s Gateway to Kabul,” The Long War
Journal, April 2008.
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As of October 2010, ISAF forces switched from an offensive to
defensive operational posture in Tagab. The area of operation, governed
by the French with an embedded US Army SOF ODA and a Provincial
Reconstruction Team, has yet to clear the AO (excluding the Tagab
bazaar). Simply stated, the area is too dangerous to conduct an offensive
“build” strategy. As one French commander observed, French troops take
fire four out of five times outside the wire and are unable to drive the
Taliban back from their positions. In a conversation with a French soldier,
an American-born Legionnaire echoed the commander’s sentiment:
When we go on patrol we get contact from all sides. Other than
FOB Kutschbach, we have no safe areas. For example, we see
farmers working in the fields. We stop and talk with them.
Sometimes they offer us a drink, raisins or nuts. We part with a
smile and a hand shake. A kilometer down the road we take
contact. Ten minutes later we are taking fire from all around in a
complex attack. When the dust settles it was the farmers that we
talked to who coordinated the attack. A different culture and
language drives our inability to connect to the people. Half the
time we just hang around the Afghans without even talking to
them and check the COIN box.
US forces in the area have not fared better. The US Army SOF at
Kutschbach in particular has their hands full. They’re tasked with the
important role of training the Afghan military and police, as well as the
local route maintenance teams (RMT) that provide security along major
roadways. Recently, however, SOF at Kutschbach have been ordered to
undertake more High Value Target (HVT) missions. This change in
strategy has limited the unit’s ability to achieve its grassroots objectives.
The HVT missions have had a double edged effect in the community. The
assassination of Taliban leaders – tenured officials in many Afghan
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communities – often creates a power vacuum, reviving long-standing
feuds and rivalries among political factions. These factions then jockey for
position, as each is hoping to win territorial control of the country when
NATO pulls out. Without accountable, pro-NATO replacements prepped
to replace Taliban leadership, the effort is circuitous.
US Army SOF are also restricted to the immediate area around the
FOB and are not able to realize their full potential in the battle space.
Valleys and main supply routes in Tagab are deemed “too risky” by ISAF
command. These limitations have been construed as stifling to both Army
SOF operators and members of the Provincal Reconstruction Teams
(PRT), both of whom are eager to effect change in Afghanistan. Part of the
tension is due to friction between French and US command, the two
Coalition entities competing for control of the battlespace. Unable to
communicate with each other effectively, they’ve set aside many pressing
issues in the AO so as not to worsen their already tenuous relationship.
Furthermore, PRTs, USAID, and other aid organizations implement
programs, train locals, and give generously to construction projects for
schools, roads, and wells. However, schools are empty, roads unused, and
wells dry. This has been the situation for almost five years, and little or no
change has occurred in the region. Although this case does not represent
all regions in Afghanistan, it does exemplify a decade’s worth of operation
protocol in which strategy has been sacrificed for tactical ambition.
French-led operations in Tagab have evolved haphazardly; instead of
implementing proactive, consciously formulated strategies, French
commanders have developed a largely reactive posture. Understanding
this phenomenon, military and civilian leadership have begun to take
greater care in consulting operators in the field. Their hope is that doing so
will prevent further errors and help construct strategies with longer-term
success.
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An HTT member embedded with US Army Special Forces
Operation Detachment Alfa for a 60-day mission. Based on the problems
presented, the following mission objectives were developed:
1. Define characteristics of key civilian areas, including districts,
municipalities, and provinces in the targeted area of operation.
Focus efforts on areas of high economic value, centers of
government or political discourse, culturally important areas,
and tribal/ethnic enclaves.
2. Analyze the capability of local authorities to perform key
functions and provide the populace with essential services.
Develop metrics of essential capabilities required to save and
sustain life, including the development of health clinics, the
provision of food, water, and sanitation services, and the
operation of public administration and public safety
organizations.
3. Understand how the community is organized according to local
definitions of order and influence. Distinguish who is formally
and informally influential in the community and what
characteristics (wealth, education, family lineage, ethnicity,
and tribe) influence perception. Determine if influential
members of the community are affiliated with organizations
that may be indigenous to the area.
A specific directive was given by French General Chavany to answer the
following questions:
1. How are insurgents undermining NATO efforts in the
region? Are they using our capabilities against us
(development funding, SOF training, technological
prowess)? How does the population respond to NATO
forces working in the area? Has there been a trend of
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success or failure with gaining the support of the
population?
2. How can NATO control the direction and outcome of the
conflict? What are our weaknesses and strengths, and how
can we improve upon them?
3. Who are the informal leaders in the community? Other than
appointed district governors and village elders, who does
the population trust? Where does the population go in order
to resolve conflicts or receive advice?
When the assignment was over, the HTT member reported his findings.
He identified development funding as a trigger point for conflict in
Kapisa, drew attention to the unintended economic consequences of
providing direct aid to locals in Tagab, and underscored the value of
identifying and working with second and third layers of leadership.
Ultimately, the information, resources, and effort that went into the
mission were subject to the discretion of NATO leadership. The following
assessments were made to General Chavancy, PRT Kapisa, the civilian
and military leadership in Kabul, and the political and military leadership
in France.

A. Recommendation One: Address Road Compensation
PRT and French commanders implemented a road construction
plan in Kapisa. The concept behind the program was to pave roads and
open routes to otherwise inaccessible villages. The long-term goal was to
increase traffic frequency to remote areas, bringing about economic and
security gains for each village. PRT Kapisa contracted the work to an
Afghan construction and security company. A noticeable increase in
violence occurred within the area shortly after the road construction plan
went into effect. PRT Kapisa and French forces utilized Human Terrain
Systems to engage the population and determine the cause of the violence.
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According to the HTT assessment, the second- and third-order
effects of the road compensation plan had fueled hostility, violence, and
corruption. The Afghan construction team used its private security force to
intimidate and forcibly remove individuals from homes and farmland.
Afghan private security teams demanded payment from homeowners to
build around their properties; those who could not afford the collateral lost
everything they had. Building through homes and private farms yielded a
higher profit margin for the construction company, cutting costs that
would have otherwise gone into building around local properties. This
increased violence in Kapisa province and created a
security/accountability vacuum in which the population felt it had no
recourse to justice.
Moreover, the contractors paid off local Afghan police and military
forces so that they would not interfere with the company’s program of
extortion. Taliban forces took advantage of this situation by providing the
community with immediate justice and security. They further capitalized
on the situation by creating a divide between the populace and NATO
forces.
After social scientists completed their field work and assessments,
they reported their findings to command leaders and field operators. This
led to a change in strategy and immediate results. For example, “[w]hen
the local population expressed dissatisfaction with previous attempts at
road compensation for homes and shops that were destroyed so the road
could be widened, Kapisa PRT and the Human Terrain Team re-initiated
road compensation discussions during a meeting with 20 local farmers in
April at Forward Operating Base Morales-Frazier.”24 Subsequent
measures included a successful road compensation program and the firing
of the contracted construction and security companies.
“Kapisa PRT, Contractors Pay Road Compensation,” n.d.,
http://www.dvidshub.net/news/58062/kapisa-prt-contractors-pay-road-compensation
(accessed August 2012).
24

32

NIGH: AN OPERATOR’S GUIDE TO HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS

B. Recommendation Two: Identify Layers of Leadership
Tagab Valley, a Taliban incubation point with strong foreign
connections, has been under comprehensive Taliban rule since the early
1990s. Taliban infestation saturates the community to the point where
NATO forces have called the AO a “no go zone.” “When the Marines
arrived in April 2008, the Tagab Valley was considered a no go area
where insurgents moved freely.”25 Leadership in the community was
restricted to two or three individuals in town. Locals appealed to NATO
forces, pleading that their needs were not being met. After nearly six
weeks, US Army SOF and a Human Terrain Team social science field
researcher devised an alternative plan to address the needs of the populace.
This entailed marginalizing the first layer of leadership and identifying
new sources of power and authority. A key finding was that mullahs held
considerable influence in the community. Using religion as a unifying
force, they were able to transcend tribal, ethnic, and familial bonds.
Furthermore, they had the unique ability to challenge the Taliban while
still holding the respect of the population.
To gain influence among the population and establish new
leadership in the community, HTS personnel began holding an “alternative
shura.” The intent was to appeal to the vanity of patriarchal figures in the
community. Implementation of the strategy was fairly simple: at the first
community-wide shura, local elites were asked, in front of the larger
community, to join ISAF leaders for a special leadership shura. While the
first layer participated in this exclusive shura, second and third layers of
leadership were identified; using a method of systematic questioning, HTT
analysts drew out natural leaders in the community, those who locals
respond to when the community’s institutionalized leaders are not present.
Jerry-Katt Meyerle and Jim Megan-Gavrilis, “Counterinsurgency on the Ground in
Afghanistan,” CNA Analysis & Solutions, November 2010.
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Not only did the team identity these unofficial leaders but they also
learned important information about the community as a whole. The
general consensus of the people in Tagab was that their leaders were a
disappointment. In the end, the alternative shura concept helped identify
new layers of leadership and addressed the communication gap between
Tagab’s population and its leaders.
After nearly two months, social scientists developed a strategy for
engaging with Tagab’s highly kinetic populace. This strategy was based
on the development of a working relationship between the Coalition and
local mullahs. Unlike the area’s businessmen, elders, and other leaders,
Tagab’s mullahs were not susceptible to Taliban influence. They not only
had the respect and trust of the community but were connected to
syndicate insurgencies in the AO,– ties that further distanced them from
the Taliban. When roaming Taliban teams came through Tagab and tried
to intimidate the mullahs, locals routinely stood up and drove the Taliban
out. Ultimately, the people unanimously pointed to their mullahs as the
most trustworthy individuals in the village. In Tagab, Mullahs hold a
special place in the community because they are able to overcome tribal,
ethnic, familial, and economic feuds. This is extremely important in a
society influenced by multiple ideologies and ethnicities. The mullah,
through Islam, represents a point of cohesion, a unifying force in a land
defined by foreign occupation, war, and death.

C. Recommendation Three: Prevent Dollarization and
Crowding Out the Population
Within Tagab is a bazaar that hosts over 10,000 people a week.
This bazaar is one of the main commercial hubs in Kapisa Province, and is
also the economic lifeblood for the people of Tagab. Food, medical
supplies, farm equipment, and basic household products are imported to
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the bazaar from Iran and Pakistan, as well as from other provinces within
Afghanistan. These products are essential for the survival of the people of
Tagab. Over the past few years, prices in the bazaar have undergone
unprecedented levels of inflation. This has had a dramatic effect on the
population; goods and services that were previously accessible are now
fiscally out of reach. The community has suffered greatly and correctly
blames NATO for their predicament.
During a comprehensive review of the economic situation in
Tagab, subject matter experts discovered that NATO forces were
purchasing significant quantities of food and medical supplies from the
bazaar. This practice, extremely common throughout Afghanistan,
essentially crowded out the local population, depriving them of access to
the market and its goods and services. According to the subject matter
experts who investigated this economic conundrum, several factors were
at play. First, NATO forces had unintentionally bid up the value of the
local merchandise. Markets in Afghanistan do not have the same level of
accessibility that markets in the West enjoy. Restrictions in transportation,
barriers to entry, and a lack in vendor supply limit the quantity of most
goods throughout Afghanistan. When NATO forces in Tagab began
attending the bazaar, they bought nearly all of the limited goods that were
available. Local merchants, cognizant of NATO’s purchasing power,
increased their prices, a measure which only served to exclude the local
community further. NATO troops, believing their behavior to be generous,
continued to satiate the price demands of the merchants.
Another problem stemmed from NATO’s use of non-Afghan
currency when purchasing goods. This issue, loosely dubbed
“dollarization,” effectively drove down the value of Afghan currency in
the community, thus increasing the cost of goods and services to area
residents. According to the local population, the infusion of large amounts
of cash in the bazaar economy never trickled down. Rather, it helped pay
for lavish homes in Dubai, where a cartel of owners – men who controlled
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shops in bazaars throughout the region – lived. “Jabarkhel [Brigadier
General Mohammed Asif Jabarkhel] is referring to the huge amounts of
money regularly being secreted out of Afghanistan by plane in boxes and
suitcases. According to some estimates, since 2007, at least $3 billion
(€2.4 billion) in cash has left the country in this way. The preferred
destination for these funds is Dubai, the tax haven in the Persian Gulf.
And, given the fact that Afghanistan's total GDP amounts to the equivalent
of $13.5 billion, there is no way that the funds involved in this exodus are
merely the proceeds of legal business transactions.”26 Back in
Afghanistan, the bazaar cartel paid insurgents to protect their financial
interests.
These factors have contributed to growing resentment and anger
toward NATO in Tagreb. As locals themselves have noted, the economic
disruption has contributed to increased violence against NATO forces in
the community. Social science operators and subject matter experts
provided this information to French military and civilian leaders in
Afghanistan and France. These leaders determined that Coalition forces
should NOT enter the Afghan commercial market, a strategy which would
prevent them from inadvertently determining how much the average
Afghan pays for goods. Instead, NATO payments were to reflect the
average consumer price index.
The problem of Coalition troops distorting local economies is
persistent throughout Afghanistan. In Kabul, for instance, prices of homes
have increased to the point where locals are no longer able to afford living
in the capital. NATO forces, NGOs, and multinational corporations have
effectively driven the prices of homes up and the indigenous population
out. “According to local estate agents prices in some parts of Kabul have
risen by 75% in the past year. Part of this is due to the fact that
international agencies are willing to pay to acquire properties in the best
Susanna Koelbl, “US Cuts Aid After Millions Siphoned Off to Dubai,” Spiegel Online
International, July 5, 2010.
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locations, but also wealthy Afghans are buying again, having had their
fingers burned in badly hit real estate markets such as Dubai.”27
Discussion Questions
1. What role does the military have in coordinating with USAID and
following up with the allocation of Commander Emergency
Response Funding (CERP)?
2. What was wrong with the assumption that having an “Afghan”
face on the road construction project would have positive effects?
3. How can a situation like this be prevented in the future?
4. Why was it necessary to bring in an HTT to determine the source
of the road construction conflict? Why did it take team input to
initiate a compensation plan for the disenfranchised locals?
5. How were local Taliban taking advantage of friction, and of seams
and gaps in communications? Why were they able to do this?
6. What could have backfired in the alternative shura? What were the
risks and were they worth the rewards?
7. What happens when the Taliban identify this strategy and how
might they adapt? What do you do next?
8. What are other methods to communicate effectively with the
population without being filtered by the Taliban and corrupt
leadership?
9. What does it take to develop a working relationship with power
brokers in the community? Can you do it without providing money
and doing favors?
10. If the mullahs worked with NATO and were protected by the
population, how would the Taliban respond?
11. How can NATO forces support the Afghan economy without
crowding out the local population?
James Melik, “Property Market in Afghanistan Capital Bucks Trend,” BBC World
Service, 2009.
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12. If NATO forces do decide to purchase goods from a local
merchant, what steps can be made to ensure price stability for the
Afghan consumer?
13. Other than buying goods from locals, what can NATO forces do,
even at a combat outpost, to encourage development and protect
the interests of the Afghan livelihood?
14. What are the primary economic weaknesses that are exploited by
the Taliban?
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IV. Relevance of Social Science Research in Combat
Zones
Bringing a social science capacity to the battle-space offers leaders
a unique perspective, adding substantive value to the military decisionmaking process. Individuals trained in the social sciences (economics,
sociology, psychology, political science, anthropology) understand the
many social factors germane to conflict and are well-positioned to present
qualified viewpoints on relevant issues. Broadly speaking, they provide a
baseline on how to understand and interpret social dynamics. But they can
also address more specific information needs. For instance, if a need exists
for an in-depth analysis unique to a particular social science discipline,
commanders can request a consultation to suit that need. Ultimately, the
value social science provides is in three areas: challenging group think,
mapping second- and third-order effects, and providing technical analyses.
People who are collectively taught, isolated from outside
influences, and exposed to a single point of view are potentially limited in
their ability to think outside the parameters of their training. This is true
regardless of the organization responsible for instruction, and it results in
individuals who are prone to lapses in self-awareness. Defined as
“groupthink,” this phenomenon can make people reluctant to offer diverse
opinions, as doing so may upset the larger organizational balance. Instead
of considering alternative scenarios and opposing arguments, individuals
are encouraged to make hasty, often irrational, decisions. In the aggregate,
these “programmed” behaviors can have a debilitating effect on an
organization. This situation is exacerbated in hierarchical organizations
like the military, where individuals are tempted to misrepresent
themselves to superiors in order to further their careers. To battle this type
of cognitive failure, it is necessary to encourage exogenous factors of
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influence. As noted in a 2008 US News and World Report article, the
Army itself has become wary of the role groupthink plays in military
affairs: “In the wake of chaos and a lethal insurgency in Iraq, blamed in no
small part on poor decisions and a lack of planning at the highest levels,
the U.S. Army has had a startling insight that is upending conventional
thinking about how the military works. That epiphany is that the force
needs fewer yes men.”28
Social scientists can play a fundamental role in creating a more
adaptive force precisely because they bring a civilian mindset to the
military context. They can ameliorate a soldier’s temptation to stereotype,
self-censor, and display unquestioned discipline. By playing “devil’s
advocate,” they encourage deeper levels of analysis and reflection.
Ultimately, their involvement in military operations is designed to
improve the quality and consistency of military decision-making process.
In a counterinsurgency environment, it is paramount to the success
of the mission that military officials and frontline soldiers fully understand
how they are perceived by the local public. It is equally important to
realize how the strategies of outside actors affect the populace. The
application of systems such as HTS fulfills both missions. Commanders
can utilize social science research by tasking SMEs with specific
investigations related to planned courses of action. Studying social
reactions in this way enables Coalition forces to anticipate or prevent the
development of community grievances and, ultimately, violence. If we are
to minimize failures on the battlefield, if we are to learn from previous
errors and realize success in Afghanistan, mapping second- and third-order
effects must be a standard requirement in military decision-making
processes.
The greatest benefit derived from mapping second- and third-order
effects has to do with prevention. Using forecasting techniques, social
Anna Mulrine, “The army trains a skeptics corps to battle groupthink, ” US News and
World Report, May 2008.
28
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science operators can evaluate and project how the population will react to
military action, albeit overt or covert.. Knowing the likely effect is
fundamental to building confidence and establishing consistency with the
populace. In virtually every field – including business, sports, government,
academia, science, and entertainment – professionals seek to develop a
matrix for understanding the second- and third-order effects of their work.
It stands to reason, considering the complex nature of war, that military
leaders embrace a similarly analytical approach.

A. Consumers of Social Science Research in the Battle
Space
Military and civilian personnel, regardless of rank or position,
benefit from the higher degrees of understanding, awareness, and
interpretation that social science frameworks offer. Social science research
can be tailored to the operational relevance of the consumer, whether a
general, a commander, or an intelligence organization; in fact, it is best
utilized when guided or administered by the consumer. Sending social
scientists into the field, where they can pick up the rhythm and feel of
battle, allows for a unique perspective in the decision-making process.
General officers have the most to gain from these efforts. Acting as
consultants, social scientists are tasked directly by the general officer and
therefore operate outside the purview of his support staff. This
arrangement is by design. Securing a direct line of communication from
SMEs to command leaders ensures that information is delivered unfiltered,
with no additional commentary or bias. Considering the evaluative nature
of this information, direct communications are essential. Social scientists
assess the effectiveness of strategies that have already been implemented,
including their impact on the populace and on other critical information
components. They evaluate campaigns, leadership, operational efficiency,
and public sentiment – all in an effort to contribute to the overall
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effectiveness of the general’s operational strength. This work is also
important in that it fills a gap in command’s understanding of the battlespace. In traditional military operations and chains of command, generals
only get information about the enemy. Indeed, it is striking how little
knowledge generals and commanders above the brigade level have of the
population in their charge. This is especially worrisome in places like
Afghanistan, where the populace is extremely segmented and diverse.
Commanders at the battalion, company, and platoon levels benefit
from the work of social scientists both strategically and operationally.
Embedded SMEs provide cultural information to help soldiers better
understand and work with the target population. They help soldiers
develop a greater awareness of cultural nuances and share specific
strategies and techniques for engaging locals. Social scientists participate
in level zero planning processes; this includes working with military
personnel to develop targets of opportunity with the community, to
contextualize the various layers of influence present in target areas, and to
anticipate points of contention. It also entails training locals to isolate
insurgents. Social scientists work on cultural and economic assessments to
determine the pace of development and the origins of influence – cultural,
financial, and religious – in each community. Furthermore, social
scientists give soldiers on patrol a sense of purpose and direction. Instead
of walking through a community, social scientists encourage patrols to
stop, talk with individual Afghans, and develop relationships with them.
Social scientists develop frameworks for understanding the businesses,
mosques, agricultural fields, and ethnic enclaves in which Coalition
soldiers must operate – frameworks that they then provide to command for
consideration.
Finally, social scientists provide intelligence organizations a
clearer picture of the non-combatant side of the population. While
traditional intelligence is mainly focused on the kinetic population, social
science research focuses entirely on the non-kinetic side of the population.
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As alluded to in a 2010 report on intelligence operations in Afghanistan,29
a narrow kinetic focus puts the entire mission in jeopardy:
Eight years into the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. intelligence
community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy.
Having focused the overwhelming majority of its collection
efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, the vast
intelligence apparatus is unable to answer fundamental questions
about the environment in which U.S. and allied forces operate
and the people they seek to persuade. Ignorant of local economics
and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how
they might be influenced, incurious about the correlations
between various development projects and the levels of
cooperation among villagers, and disengaged from people in the
best position to find answers – whether aid workers or Afghan
soldiers – U.S. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but
shrug in response to high level decision-makers seeking the
knowledge, analysis, and information they need to wage a
successful counterinsurgency.30

29

http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507
_voices.pdf
Flynn, GEN. Michael T./Pottinger, CAPT Matt/Batchelor, Paul, “Fixing Intel: A
Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Center for a New American
Security. Jan 2010.
30

43

NIGH: AN OPERATOR’S GUIDE TO HUMAN TERRAIN TEAMS

Discussion Questions
1. What are the limitations to social science research in a battlefield
environment?
2. What difficulty might there be in persuading a military officer or
his superiors to accept unexpected second- and third-order effects
that a SME foresees?
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V. Methodology
The methodology outlined below is designed to draw out societal
grievances that explain and predict anti-NATO activities . This data
collection plan serves as a resource for commanders and field operators in
Afghanistan, including leaders tasked with implementing COIN strategies,
building consensus, and reducing casualties. The methodology is simple in
theory, but it is dangerous to execute and its effects are challenging to
analyze. To implement this type of advisory program successfully,
individuals must act resolutely and examine data rigorously. They must
also be flexible, as the methodology itself may be refined to meet
operational needs.
The method of analysis is ordered into a three-step data collection
plan: the identification of group identity, the study of community power
structures, and the analysis of local hierarchies of need.

A. Step One: Social Identity
In the counterinsurgency battle-space, identifying social groups
must be the first priority. Ancillary factors such as economics, religion,
and culture must be contextualized within the sphere of the social group.
This is especially important in less developed states that lack
accountability in the central government. Foundational elements like
religion can vastly differ from one social group to another, despite
logistical proximity and historical ties. This phenomenon has become
prevalent in Afghanistan, due to years of destabilization from war,
poverty, and lawlessness. Social groups have developed as religious and
tribal microcosms. Afghans can no longer be identified through their tribe
or region. The Afghan identity is understood at the village level and is
subject to innumerable factors relative to each region. The following
outlines a systematic process for developing an awareness of the social
groups that exert spheres of influence in Afghan communities.
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To begin, it is important to develop an outline of how people
identify themselves in a community. What beliefs do they subscribe to?
Where do they live? How are they organized? Where do they congregate?
The purpose of asking these questions is to collect metrics, which are then
used to identify similarities in how people identify themselves relative to
one another. The collector must make these determinations himself, rather
than depend on the community’s definition.
Considerations such as geographic location, territorial control,
tribal/sub-tribal affiliation, mosque affiliation, areas of contention, and
leadership provide a broad picture of how social groups define
membership. The key factor is identifying how these groups interact with
each other. Chances are that conflict exists within the community, and
identifying those conflict triggers will play a large role in understanding
how the insurgency manipulates the population. Ultimately, the
community will divide into social groups for the purpose of survival and
shared interest. Make no mistake: on the surface, ideology will appear to
be the primary adhesive component to the group. In reality, however,
pragmatic factors such as security and mutual economic interest are more
fundamental to group dynamics.

B. Step Two: Civic Power Study
After a thorough collection and analysis of the social structure,
focus should move toward developing an exhaustive understanding of who
is formally and informally influential in the community. Understanding
layers of leadership in the community is essential for developing allies and
identifying enemies. On the surface, community leaders may deliberately
misrepresent themselves in order to lull interviewers into dropping their
guard and being more trusting.
If leadership in the community is not tied to insurgency, it is still
important to understand who is effective and who is not. To develop
metrics on leadership, understanding which leadership traits are esteemed
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in the community is essential. Traits such as wealth, prestige, number of
wives, education, familial lineage, land ownership, and insurgent ties will
afford varying degrees of power and influence. The weight of each trait is
relative to each community. That being said, it is necessary to seek
answers from the population to understand what it takes to become a
leader, to review how leaders in the community gained power, and to
understand how those positions have evolved historically. Finally, gaps
and layers of leadership in the community should be identified. This is the
most important component in plotting the power scheme that determines
social hierarchy. Generally speaking, first-layer leadership in a community
under the control or influence of an insurgency will have connections with
said insurgency. The first layers will not always represent the will and
voice of the community. To properly assess and affect the populace,
identifying who is in informal leadership positions is absolutely essential.
These individuals form the second layer of leadership and can accurately
represent the true dynamics of the community. They can also fill
leadership vacuums in the event that first layers are removed.

C. Step Three: Hierarchy of Needs
Finally, the social science operator will establish a hierarchy of
needs in terms of economy, infrastructure, education, and health care. It is
important to establish a rank of needs in the community to determine the
urgency of implementing scarce resources. More importantly, it is
paramount to the success of the development scheme to identify if the
allocation will trigger conflict.
It is important to consider the most unbiased perspective when
assessing the community. Virtually everyone is going to have a personal
stake in acquiring development/reconstruction funds and will do and say
whatever it takes to benefit. To properly assess the needs of the populace,
a thorough examination of the community must occur outside the
observations of the community members.
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The first priority must be to develop a baseline collection plan that
will focus on cataloguing the quality, availability and restrictions of food
staples. Who has access and why? It is important to consider the current
price and what the pricing trends have been over the past few years. Other
factors include where the food comes from, price discrimination,
environmental factors (flood, drought), and abundance (does farming exist
to the level to provide for the whole community?). The next priority
should be to assess the quality of waste management, including the
sanitary condition of the community. Social scientists need to collect
water samples, examine refuse outlets, and determine where human waste
is discarded. In less-developed communities, disease caused by unsanitary
conditions can wipe out the populace despite ample food resources.
Development professionals are often afraid to tackle this issue out of fear
of offending the populace and a general disdain for the subject. The reality
is, no matter how many schools, medical clinics, or roads are built, if the
people cannot live in sanitary conditions, efforts are moot. Other areas of
infrastructure include quality and availability of roads, medical care,
schools and communications. Determining the availability and abundance
of said infrastructure inputs will provide a clear picture of the
community’s priorities.

D. Implementation and Field Research
Field research and collection techniques make up the meat of what
the social science operator does in the field. Without time in the field,
observing, analyzing, and interviewing, the product is nothing more than a
regurgitation of previous work and effort. Thus it is important to
understand what a social scientist does in the field, how he/she collects
information, interacts with the populace, assesses events, analysis data,
and essentially creates a niche that others, without similar training and
experience, could not do. Social science field research or combat
ethnography cannot occur without fluid integration with the unit. The unit
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must feel comfortable with the individual both professionally, tactically,
and personally. A humble, honest, and professional demeanor is absolutely
necessary to make the relationship work. Ultimately, the social scientist
works at the behest of the unit and subsequent commanders. Although he
or she should have a voice in the planning process, hierarchical decrees
ultimately dictate operational tempo and priorities.
The intent of pursuing data is to provide a baseline assessment that
will grow and develop according to knowledge gaps and operational
needs. The requisite objectives are neither exclusive nor subjective toward
a specific end-state. Rather, they serve as a starting point, according to the
aforementioned three tiers of analysis. It will best serve the quality and
rigor of the analysis to make every effort to personally interview the
population in their own environment. This approach will reduce bias and
contextual influence that interviewing on a base or other NATO-enforced
complex will provide.
The collection and dissemination process of field data is never
static. To maintain a comprehensive picture of operational environment,
collection procedures must constantly be employed. The optimal scenario
is full attachment and integration, which begins at the brigade level under
the purview of a general. The general has full control of the social scientist
and his or her team. The critical component is providing the brigade with a
constant flow of relevant information and following the Commander’s
Critical Information Requirements. From the Brigade, the team will
embed with a platoon, generally at a combat outpost. The relevance and
quality of the work will rely on the working relationship and respect of the
Platoon. A key component to this is having current military or ex-military
personnel on the team with the social scientist. Conflicting cultural
nuances between the military and civilians can be brokered through this
component.
As explained above, the aim of the social scientist is to uncover
layers of the social dynamics that make up the identity of the community.
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This is done through a systematic collection plan that digs beneath casual
observation. Generalizing this plan is difficult, and considerations must be
given to the location in which it is being implemented. An example of a
plan follows, including the initial questions that were used in Afghanistan.

Discussion Questions
1.
If the social scientist clashes with the forces he or she is
embedded with, what might the consequences be? What might
influence how seriously a SME’s recommendations are taken?
What would be the consequences of that?
2.
Is an outside professional always required to figure out
such things as the social structure and a community’s needs? If so,
why? If not, how else could this be done?
3.
If a proposed development plan is identified as low priority
or likely to cause conflict in the community, what should happen?
What relationship should there be between an occupying military
force and the international development community?
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VI. Social Science Operational Schedule (CONOP)
A. Schedule
The following is a systematic schedule that was employed in
Afghanistan by social scientists in Kandahar and Kapisa provinces. The
process is broken down into a six-week actionable program that concludes
with Command and staff briefings. Ultimately, these briefings resulted in
recommendations for moving forward in the same AO or moving into
other AOs as designated by military or civilian leadership. This particular
operation took approximately six weeks to complete. Variations in
operation procedures are dependent upon a myriad of factors and thus not
bound to set timelines. The following is simply an example of one such
schedule implemented over a 12-month period in Afghanistan.
The process usually begins by meeting with the general and his
staff to capture a picture of the AO, requisite Commander’s Critical
Information Requirements (CCIRs), and the operational timeline. From
that point, the team takes about a week to develop a pre-baseline
assessment. Phase One focuses on data capture from the general’s staff,
identifying knowledge gaps, engagement strategies, operational challenges
in the field, and expectations. Analysts review intelligence material to
paint a clear kinetic and non-kinetic picture of the AO. Data is
consolidated with CCIRs, Company and Platoon Leaders Stability
Operations Aide-Memoires and Societal IPB’s to identify knowledge
gaps. Analytical efforts conclude with a comprehensive research plan that
outlines implied objectives. Phase Two includes pre-mission preparations,
coordination with field entities, and all tactical/support requirements.
Phase Three, lasting at least three weeks, is spent in the field. Effort is
concentrated on conducting original field research designed to answer all
socio-cultural CCIRs. Finally, Phase Four concludes the concept of
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operation with analysis and dissemination of all captured data. Information
is consolidated and presented through Command and staff briefings.

B. Example of a Mission Conducted in Afghanistan
The following timetable was developed for a mission in March 2010 in
Bazaar’e Panjwai (Kandahar Province).
1) Concept of Operation (CONOP)
i) Phase 1: 30 March – 1 April
(a) Data capture from TFK, AF-IV, DCGS, CIDNE, and
KPRT
(b) Analyze consolidated data and build baseline
assessment
(c) Use CCIRs, “Company and Platoon Leaders Stability
Operations Aide-Memoire” and “Societal IPB” to
identify knowledge gaps and create research plan
(d) Pre-mission prep and research
ii) Phase 2: 2 April – 18 April
(a) Conduct original, specific field research designed to
answer socio-cultural CCIRs
iii) Phase 3: 19 April – 25 April
(a) Analysis, production and dissemination
(b) Command and staff briefs
(c) Way Ahead
2) Implementation
i) Three social scientists spent 21 days in Bazaar-e Panjwai
ii) 32 foot patrols in the community
iii) Held shuras with local community leaders
iv) Occupant interviews at vehicle checkpoints
v) Conducted over 50 individual interviews
vi) Surveyed local businesses and mosques
vii) Held interviews on base
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3) Findings
i) Social Groups
ii) Community Power Study
iii) Hierarchy of Needs
4) Commander’s Guidance?
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VII. Annexes
Annex A: Collection Objectives
The intent of pursuing data on the following will provide a baseline
assessment that will grow and develop according to knowledge gaps and
operational needs. The requisite objectives are neither exclusive nor
subjective toward a specific end-state. Rather, they serve as a starting
point according to the aforementioned three-tiers of analysis. It will best
serve the quality and rigor of the analysis to make every effort to
personally interview the following in their own environment. This
approach will reduce bias and contextual influence that interviewing on a
base or other NATO-enforced complex will provide.
Mosques
 Obtain or update grid coordinates on all major mosques and submosques with picture
 Identify tribal affiliation to mosques
 Identify associated elders to mosques and or persons of influence
 Determine if and how mosques generate revenue
◦ Populace (tithes)?
◦ External factors?
◦ Wealthy beneficiaries?
 Determine congregation size and affiliation for or against NATO or
insurgency
Mullah
 Basic biometrics (Get Picture)
◦ Name
◦ Age
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◦
◦
◦
◦


Tribal Affiliation
Spoken Language & Dialect
Place of Birth
Education
▪ Location?
Determine who the most influential Mullah or Imam is in Tagab.
◦ Is there a hierarchy?
◦ How is the Mullah appointed or recruited?
◦ What relationship do they have with the community?
◦ Is there conflict between Mullahs?
 Ideology?
 Congregation size (competition)
 Money?
◦ Does the community approach the Mullah or Elder when they
are faced with problems?
◦ How can the Mullah effect change in the community?

Business & Commerce (Excluding Agriculture)
 Get grid coordinates and picture on all businesses in Tagab
 What do they sell?
 Where do the goods come from?
 What specific products are in demand?
 What are the major impediments of growth in the specific
business?
 How many customers do they get every week/month?
 What are the busiest days of the week and why?
 Where do customers come from?
 What is their average monthly profit?
◦ What is the most lucrative month or months of the year?
 Who are their major competitors?
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Do they have to give a certain percentage of their income to
anyone? Insurgents, government officials, etc?

Business Owners
 Biometrics including:
◦ Name
◦ Age
◦ Tribe
◦ Birth Location
◦ Education
◦ Spoken Language
 What mosque they attend?
 Who they trust in Tagab and why?
 What are the major factors of conflict in Tagab?
 Who is the most influential business person in Tagab and why?
 How can business improve in Tagab?
 Perceptions of ANA/ANP/RMT?
Second Layer Leadership
 Mirro (Water Distributor) ultimately it is going to be very
difficult to approach every farmer. The Mirro acts as a conduit to
the farming community and can be an excellent resource.
◦ Basic Biometrics
◦ How he come to his position (elected, appointed, etc)?
◦ How water is “fairly” allocated?
◦ Does he have a list of all major landowners?
◦ Who is the most influential landowner/farmer in Tagab?
◦ How can Tagab expand its agricultural market?
◦ Where do agricultural products go after harvest?
◦ What is the most lucrative agricultural product in Tagab and
why?
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Teachers
◦ Basic Biometrics
◦ Where they teach?
◦ Subject(s), syllabus, teaching materials/resources?
◦ Where were they educated? In what subject? To what level?
◦ How many hours do students stay in school?
◦ How old are oldest/youngest students?
◦ How many students are taught?
◦ Is education a problem in Tagab? If so why?
◦ What are possible impediments toward comprehensive
education in Tagab?
◦ How do insurgents effect education in Tagab?
◦ What resources are needed to improve the educational system?
◦ Should women be educated? Why?
◦ What is the difference between a Madrassa and a traditional
school?
◦ Do traditional schools have a positive or negative influence?
Do Madrassa's have a positive or negative influence?
◦ Does the community or insurgency react differently to a
Madrassa then a traditional school?
Doctors
◦ Basic Biometrics
◦ Where were they educated? Do they have any specialties?
What is their highest level of education?
◦ How many clinics operate in Tagab?
◦ How many doctors are in Tagab?
◦ Does the insurgency impact how the doctors operate? If so,
how?
◦ What are the major illnesses of the populace? Why?
◦ How can NATO work with “you” to improve health care in
Tagab?
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◦
◦
◦
◦
◦


Are clinics run by the government?
Do private clinics operate in Tagab?
Where do pharmaceuticals come from?
Can the populace afford the cost of pharmaceuticals?
Does tribalism or other social factors effect who doctors or
clinics choose to support or help?
Elders
◦ Obtain biometrics on all Elders
◦ Try to identify layers of Elder leadership including Mosque
affiliation, spheres of influence, insurgent connections, political
affiliations, etc
◦ How does an Elder obtain a seat of power at Shuras or other
decision making gatherings?
◦ How are Elders viewed by the populace?

Baseline Engagement (Broader Picture)
1. Protect the Population.
o What are the influences on the population in Tagab and how
can the negative influences be defeated, and the positive
influences be enhanced, to extend the influence of NATO and
the Afghan Government?
 Who are the key formal and informal leaders?
 Who are the second- and third-tier formal and informal
leaders?
 How do the formal and informal leaders interact / cooperate
/ compete with one another? In what arenas? What are the
foundations for this cooperation / competition?
 How do the religious, social, political, and economic
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leaders interact / cooperate / compete?
Which leader(s) would the populace most likely go to and
for which issues?
What does the populace identify as their hierarchy of
needs?
What are the primary / secondary / tertiary social, political,
and economic groups within the community and how do
they interact?
How does Tagab connect with the rest of Kapisa? With the
rest of Afghanistan? With neighboring countries?
How does the population feel about their formal and
informal leaders? Who is seen as effective / ineffective and
why?
How well does the populace believe NATO/Afghan central
government is doing?
Who resolves conflict? At what level and between whom?
Whose decisions are binding? Why?

2. Separate the Insurgent.
o Where is the insurgent finding sanctuary and how and from
whence is he supplied and sustained? How can we disrupt this
to separate the insurgent from the population?
 Which individuals / groups support the insurgency and
why?
 Which individuals / groups resist the insurgency and why?
 How strong does the insurgency appear to the populace?
How strong do ISAF appear to the populace? What factors
play into these perceptions?
 How is the network of insurgent support in Tagab
connected with other areas in Kapisa? With other areas in
Afghanistan? With neighboring countries?
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What services / functions does the insurgency provide to
the population? Where are the gaps in NATO/Afghan
government services and regional functions?
What kinds of support (intelligence, resources, safe haven,
transportation, weapons, fighters, etc.) do the different parts
of Tagab provide – if any – to the insurgency and why?

3. Freedom of Movement.
o What is preventing freedom of movement for Afghans on the
key highways and how can these impediments be removed?
 Are there any roads that the populace cannot use? Which
ones are they? Why are they unavailable?
 How does the populace work around closed roadways?
 Are there any particular groups / individuals that the
populace goes to in order to use certain roadways?
 How does the populace resolve transportation issues?
 Which roadways are most important to the populace and
why?
 How does the population know that a road is closed or offlimits?
 Who does the population believe is most responsible for
transportation issues and closures?
 How is the Tagab transportation network interconnected
with the rest of Kapisa? With the rest of Afghanistan?
4. Mission Protection.
o How will the insurgency attack our cohesion and seek to
separate us from the people and their Government (local,
regional, national)? How can we defeat that threat?
 What is the insurgency’s information operations campaign?
 What does it focus on?
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How effective is it in effecting a change in the
population’s behavior?
 How successfully has it penetrated the Tagab area?
 What methods are employed to disseminate their
message?
 What actors within the community actively re-broadcast
or otherwise disseminate the insurgents’ message?
How?
What are the key elements of the NATO/Afghan
government I/O campaign?
 How effective is it in effecting a change in the
population’s behavior?
 How successfully has it penetrated the Tagab area?
What are some of the most important issues facing the
Tagab community?
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